Karaha Bodas case is a notorious case which demonstrates how is unpredictable of the Indonesian court's practice when facing cases related to arbitration. This case shows various aberrations of the principles that have been commonly accepted in international commercial arbitration but distorted in practice, especially in Indonesia, therefore many experts in the field of international commercial arbitration always mention this case as a "pathology" in international commercial arbitration.
Introduction
Two features which are offered by arbitration, as an out of court dispute resolution, is the finality of the award and cross border enforceability of the award YURIDIKA FAKULTAS HUKUM UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA by virtue of the New York Convention 1958.1 Even though an arbitral award has its finality once it was issued by the tribunal, however in most jurisdictions the arbitral award is subject to the system of court control.
2 Under the system of court control, one party may institute a setting aside procedure against the arbitral award, while another party requests enforcement. Facing these actions, the enforcement judge may suspend his decision on the request for enforcement until the setting aside judge renders his decision.
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The statistic shows that almost defeated parties in arbitration have willingness to comply with the terms of international arbitral awards against them or settle soon after the award is rendered. 4 The successful party expects that the award will be carried out in a reasonable time and voluntarily. However in some cases, it can be found that defeated parties refuse to comply against the arbitral award, instead they seek to set aside the award through court proceeding. In this situation, there are links between two procedures. In an international arbitration, the successful party may request enforcement to the courts where the losing party has assets. The failed party may oppose the enforcement, and if the court is satisfied by opposing grounds which are invoked by the failed party, the court may refuse to enforce the award.
The refusal for enforcing the award is not the end of story, the successful party still can request enforcement to the other jurisdictions where the failed party's assets are situated. On the opposite, the failed party may apply a request for setting aside the award before the court in which, or under the law of which, the award has been made. When the award is set aside by the competent court, in principle, the award can no longer be enforced to any other country.
5
The interaction between the setting aside and the enforcement of an 1 I owe this term (pathology in international commercial arbitration) from Vesna Lazic, lecturer and researcher at Mollengraaf Instituut voor Privaatrecht, Universiteit Utrecht, the Netherlands.
2 Mauro Cappelletti, 'Arbitration' in Pieter Sanders (ed) , International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Volume XVI, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) . [129] .
3 ibid. [157] . See: 'The New York Convention 1958: An Overview' , Yearbook Commercial Arbitration (Volume XXV, Kluwer Law 2003) . [6] .
4 Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 1999) . [443] .
5 'The New York Convention 1958: An Overview'. [5] international arbitral award always involving national courts within cross border permits such annulment.
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The case became interesting and complicated. After Pertamina got final judgement from the Indonesian district court, Pertamina tried to set aside the enforcement judgment which was issued by the U.S. district court. This paper will discuss two issues regarding the tension between the enforcement and the setting aside of an arbitral award: what kind of jurisdiction is recognized by the New York
Convention in terms of post-rendered an arbitral award? and what is the effect of setting aside of an award to the enforcement of the award in any other jurisdictions?.
The Competent Court for Setting Aside and Enforcing an International

Arbitral Award
The New York Convention 1958 governs the matter of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the convention does not providespecifically -the matter of setting aside an international arbitral awards. It seems that the New York Convention 1958 imposing the matter of setting aside of an international arbitral awards to the national law. 21 However, we still can find the provisions which is related to the annulment of arbitral awards as provided in Article V(1)(e) and Article VI of the New York Convention 1958. 22 Article V(1)(e) of the convention states as followed: "1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:……(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made".
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The article gives effect that the enforcing court may refuse to enforce an arbitral and other leading international arbitration conventions impose no express international limits on the grounds available for annulment; these grounds are almost exclusively matters of local law."); then at p. 2553 ("…, international arbitration conventions have generally not been interpreted as imposing limits on the grounds that may be invoked to annul an arbitral award, thus leaving the subject almost entirely to national law.").
22 'The New York Convention 1958: An Overview'.[9] . will be discussed on the issue related to Part III of this paper. See: Infra. [9] . 23 ibid.
award if the court which has competency to set aside the award has annulled the award. From this article, the New York Convention 1958 recognizes two jurisdictions in post-rendered of an arbitral award to review the award. The first jurisdiction related to set aside an arbitral award; and the second jurisdiction deals with the enforcement of the arbitral award.
The Primary Jurisdiction
The New York Convention 1958 establishes principle that the jurisdiction to set aside an arbitral award, also called "the primary jurisdiction", should belong to the competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that the arbitral award was made. 24 Thus, it can be drawn that the jurisdiction to set aside the award may be referred to: the authority in the country where the arbitration has its seat; or the authority in the country where the lex arbitri of that country was used to produce the award.
The authority which is laid on the country in which the arbitration has its seat, is derived from the seat theory, the traditional "seat theory" follows that the law of the arbitration is the law of the place of the arbitral proceedings; the lex arbitri is the lex loci arbitri. Thus an arbitrator must bow to mandatory norms of the country in which he sits. 25 This authority, which is attached to the seat of arbitration, may also ensure that private system of justice meets at least minimum standards of fairness, so that arbitration is not a system that is fraudulent, corrupt or lacking in essential due process.
27
The authority to set aside an arbitral award can also be referred to the authority of which the lex arbitri of a state is used to render the award. Usually, the parties have agreed, on their arbitration agreement, that a particular lex arbitri will govern the arbitration conduct. This authority has its foundation on contractual theory, this theory suggests that the validity of an arbitral process is wholly dependent on the consensual agreement of the parties as to its conduct. However, it is dependent on the assumption that an existing legal system confers such freedom to so agree on the parties. 28 The authority which is sourced from the consensual of the parties, also has its legitimacy according to party autonomy theory. This theory emphasizes the entrenchment of arbitration in different legal system, as a self-standing mechanism of its own that should not be subsumed under an inappropriate legal category. The theory projects the freedom of parties to choose a lex arbitri, while not disregarding the state as the precursor of the right.
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The problem may arise when the parties have expressly agreed on a particular lex arbitri other than the arbitration law in which the arbitration has its seat (lex loci arbitri), which also has been expressly chosen. This situation will be depended upon the lex loci arbitri itself, if it allows such a choice, then the lex arbitri chosen by the parties may apply to the arbitral process. However, if the lex loci arbitri does not allow the freedom to choose any other lex arbitri, subsequently the lex loci arbitri may prevail.
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The grounds to set aside an arbitral award are established by the national law, 
The Secondary Jurisdiction
Another jurisdiction which is established by, and becomes the main concern of, the New York Convention 1958 is the jurisdiction to enforce the arbitral awards. Thus, the enforcement authorities, according to the convention, are the authorities other than the authority of the country of origin in which the award has been made, the enforcement authorities also called "secondary jurisdiction".
Usually, and it is in almost all cases, the secondary jurisdiction are the courts where the assets of defeated party are situated.
Unlike the primary jurisdiction which has more freedom to lay its decision to set aside an arbitral award according to national law, the courts of secondary According to the convention, the party who seeks enforcement of the award are required to provide the court with the authenticated original award or a certified copy, and the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy. 34 In addition, if the award or the agreement is not in the same language used in the enforcing jurisdiction, the party must provide a certified translation of the documents. 35 In order to support the enforcement of the award, the New York Convention provides only a limited number of defences to enforcement, they are also considered exhaustive, meaning they are the only grounds on which non-enforcement can be raised. 36 The enforcement court may refuse to enforce an arbitral award if the resisting party can proof that the award meets the following condition: 1) the incapacity of the parties or the invalidity of the arbitration agreement; 2) lack of arbitration notice or unfair arbitration proceedings; 3) arbitrator acted in excess of authority; 4) the tribunal or the procedure was contrary to the agreement; and 5) the award is not yet binding or has been set aside by the competent authority. 37 The court may also refuse to enforce an arbitral award on its own motion if the court finds that: 1) the disputes were lack of arbitrability; and 2) the award may violate the public policy.
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The Jurisdiction to Set Aside the Award in Karaha Bodas Case
In Karaha Bodas case, Pertamina, as the defeated party, had tried to set aside the award by applying to the Swiss court, as the authority under the lex loci arbitri, Pertamina did not comply to pay court fees on time. 39 This fact shows that Pertamina acknowledged the Swiss court as the primary jurisdiction over the arbitral award.
However, Pertamina then denied Swiss court as the primary jurisdiction by applying petition to the District Court of Central Jakarta and acknowledged it as the primary jurisdiction. Pertamina argued that Indonesian procedural law applied to its arbitration with KBC, the Fifth Circuit rejected this position, relying upon the strong presumption that the law applicable to any arbitral procedure is the lex arbitri -the law of the arbitral situs, which in the present case was Switzerland. 40 Occasional contractual references to certain Indonesian civil procedure rules were insufficient to rebut this presumption. 41 The appellate court also held that Swiss courts had primary jurisdiction, and the Indonesian courts only secondary jurisdiction over the proceedings.
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In this case, regarding the jurisdiction, the District Court of Central Jakarta made two errors. First, while the District Court of Central Jakarta could have applied the New York Convention 1958, however the convention has no place in an action to set aside an award. 43 Second, even assuming the convention governs annulment proceedings, the court erred in concluding that the Indonesian court is a "competent authority" to vacate the Swiss award under the convention. 44 The Indonesian courts are the secondary jurisdiction which only have jurisdiction to enforce or refuse to enforce an arbitral award which is sought its enforcement within Indonesian jurisdiction.
Moreover, regarding the grounds for setting aside, the District Court of Central Jakarta decided the annulment totally departed from the provisions in the Indonesian 
The Effect of Setting Aside of an Arbitral Award against the Enforcement of the Award
Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention 1958 provides that to be enforceable, the award should not have been previously set aside in the country where rendered, or under the law of which it was subjected. 47 The setting aside authority is the court where the award was rendered. Traditionally, in principle, 45 Republik Indonesia, 'Indonesian Arbitration' (Indonesia 1999 according to Article V(1)(e) of the convention, when defeated party is successful to set aside the award in competent authority, the award has no further legal force or effect, and cannot be enforced in any other jurisdiction, 48 and certainly the award cannot be enforced in the jurisdiction where it was set aside.
In most cases, the enforcement courts will follow the rule of Article V(1)(e),
and not to enforce a vacated award. However, such principle does not absolutely work, because Article V(1)(e) provides the enforcement courts with some discretion.
The first sentence of the Article V(1) states that recognition and the enforcement of the award may be refused -and not "must" be refused -if the defenses listed in the article are proofed. Therefore the enforcement courts have discretion whether they will or will not enforce an award which has been vacated in the country of origin.
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Some jurisdictions have taken position that a vacated award has possibility to be enforced in their jurisdiction. For instance in France, the law governing international arbitration in that country provides five grounds for the court of appeals to refuse the enforcement. 50 If the grounds for setting aside of an award decided by the court in the country of origin is not in the listed grounds as provided in the French arbitration law, thus the French Court will enforce the award although it has been set aside by the competent court in the country of origin. 51 The German arbitration law also provides a list of grounds on which an award can be challenged. "If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made to a competent authority referred to in Article V(1)(e), the authority before which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the decision on the enforcement of the award and may also, on the application of the party claiming enforcement of the award, order the other party to give suitable security".
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From the article, the enforcement court has discretion, at the request of the party who seeks for setting aside or suspension of an award, whether it will decide or retain the decision to enforce an arbitral award until the proceeding in the country of origin has established its decision.
The provision has an intention to prevent the party who wants to frustrate the enforcement proceeding, by applying for setting aside the arbitral award in the competent authority, with empowering the enforcement court to order the party to
give suitable security on the request of the other party. 57 The enforcement court may also have authority to consider the grounds on setting aside whether or not it will
give serious impact to the risk if the award in fact will be set aside. If that is the case, the enforcement court can refuse the recognition and enforcement, or grant it on condition that security be given, so that in the event that the award was set aside, the previously existing situation can be restored (restitutio in integrum). 58 On the other hand, the provision also wants to ensure that if the award is set aside by the competent authority and thus loses the benefit of the convention, it could not be 55 ibid. [912] . Article VII of the New York Convention 1958 contains two provisions, the first is the compatibility provision, in which that the New York Convention does not affect the validity any other treaties in the field of arbitration; and the second provision is the more favourable right provision (mfr provision) which provides the freedom of the party to base its request for enforcement of an arbitral award on the domestic law concerning enforcement of foreign arbitral awards bypassed with a rapid enforcement decision in another jurisdiction while the issue was still pending in the country of origin. This illustrates that Indonesian court's annulment fails to jeopardize enforcement of the award elsewhere as well.
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In its summary, the U.S. Courts of Appeals stated that although Indonesian court has already purported to annul the award, such annulment in no way affects the authority of the U.S. courts to enforce the award in the United States.
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Conclusion
Indonesian courts obviously were not the proper forum to set aside the Swiss arbitral award in the Karaha Bodas case. The parties had agreed that the arbitration would be in Geneva Swiss, and there was no sufficient evidence that Indonesian
Civil Procedure was applicable on the arbitration process. There is no arbitration principle or practice could support Pertamina's argumentation that the Indonesian courts were primary jurisdiction over the award. Pursuant to the New York Convention 1958, the Indonesian courts were secondary jurisdiction which only
